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Within the broad research scenario of quantum secure communication, Two-Way Quantum Key Distribution
(TWQKD) is a relatively new proposal for sharing secret keys that is not fully explored yet. We analyse the
security of TWQKD schemes that use qubits prepared in non-orthogonal states to transmit the key. Investigating
protocols that employ an arbitrary number of bases for the channel preparation, we show, in particular, that the
security of the LM05 protocol can not be improved by the use of more than two preparation bases. We also
provide a new proof of unconditional security for a deterministic TWQKD protocol recently proposed [Phys.
Rev. A 88, 062302 (2013)]. In addition, we introduce a novel deterministic protocol named “TWQKD six-state”
and compute an analytical lower bound (which can be tightened) for the maximum amount of information that
an eavesdropper could extract in this case. An interesting advantage of our approach to the security analysis of
TWQKD is the great simplicity and transparency of the derivations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) harnesses the laws of
Quantum Mechanics to distribute a secret key with a security
level unachievable by classical means [1–4]. In a QKD pro-
tocol two parties, commonly called Alice (message sender)
and Bob (message receiver), want to establish a secret key
between them, by sending quantum and classical information
through an insecure channel. The communication channel can
be spied by a powerful eavesdropper, typically called Eve,
who is assumed to be technologically much more advanced
than Alice and Bob. Thus, Eve can listen all the transmitted
classical messages and manipulate the quantum information
at her own will, in principle, being only limited by the laws
of Quantum Physics. However, this manipulation unavoid-
ably introduces perturbations of quantum nature, which may
be detected by the communication partners (Alice and Bob),
depending on the features of the communication protocol they
are employing. In such a way, they are able to determine how
much information was leaked and keep only the secure part in
the final secret key.
Standard QKD protocols (One-Way protocols), such as
BB84 [5–9], six-state [10, 11] and and SARG04 [9, 12–14],
use an encoding method that prevents Bob to decode the in-
formation in a deterministic way. This means that a fraction
of the transmitted key bits must be discarded, due to the fact
that Bob’s measurements do not allow him to deduce with cer-
tainty the corresponding values. On the other hand, Two-Way
Quantum Key Distribution (TWQKD) protocols [15–21] can
provide a solution to this flaw. In this kind of protocols the
preparation of the quantum states that will be encoded is car-
ried out by Bob. Therefore, with this additional knowledge,
he can always perform the right decoding measurements and
no bits must be discarded. An important factor to assess the
performance of a given QKD protocol is the key rate, that is,
the number of secret key bits distributed per unit of time. Be-
sides the improvements related to technological developments
[22], the use of qudits instead of two-level systems has been
proposed as an option to achieve larger secret key rates [23].
TWQKD protocols have also the potential to fulfill this goal,
given that the key bits can be decoded more efficiently than
with One-Way schemes.
Regarding security, it was recently shown that the per-
formance of some TWQKD protocols is comparable to that
of their One-Way counterparts and can even surpass it [19].
The two paradigmatic TWQKD schemes proposed to date are
LM05 (based on non-orthogonal states) [16] and the Ping-
Pong protocol (based on entanglement) [15], both of them be-
ing deterministic. In spite that the original Ping-Pong protocol
is vulnerable to zero error attacks [24, 25], there exists a non-
deterministic version that overcomes this shortcoming and has
been proven secure [19]. On the other hand, security proofs
for LM05 and a deterministic TWQKD protocol inspired on
it (LM05’) are given in [26, 27] and [19], respectively.
In this work we investigate the security of several TWQKD
schemes based on non-orthogonal states, including determin-
istic and non-deterministic ones. The proofs that we construct
guarantee security against collective attacks, when the clas-
sical post-processing is implemented with “direct reconcilli-
ation” [2]. In Section II we describe the basic structure of
the protocols studied here. In Section III we present a sim-
ple TWQKD protocol, whose security proof constitutes the
basis of some subsequent results. Next, we prove in Section
IV the security of the LM05’ protocol, by introducing a slight
modification that reduces the corresponding analysis to that
of the scheme described in Section III. Finally, Section V is
focused on the study of two new deterministic TWQKD pro-
tocols. One of them can be seen as a generalization of the
LM05 protocol, due to the use of more than two preparation
bases. We prove that the security of this generalized protocol
is the same of LM05. For the latter protocol, which we term
“TWQKD six-state”, we provide a lower bound for the eaves-
dropping information that coincides with the corresponding
to the six-state protocol [2, 28, 29]. The security of the novel
TWQKD six-state protocol is at least as good as that of LM05’
and probably even bigger (considering the tightness of the
bound tracked down). All the calculations are performed an-
alytically, showing explicitly the attacks that allow Eve to get
a given amount of information. We take advantage of the so
called Gram matrix formulation [30] in our analysis.
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2II. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE TWO-WAY
PROTOCOLS INVESTIGATED
The basic modus operandi of the protocols considered here
is the following (see Fig. 1 for a general description):
1. Bob (the message receiver) prepares the i-th qubit state
from a basis set {|ψi〉}i, according to some probability
distribution, and sends it to Alice through the quantum
forward channel (QFC).
2. Alice (the message sender) performs the Encoding
Mode (EM) with probability pe and Control Mode
(CM) with probability pc (pe + pc = 1). In EM she
encodes one bit of information, by randomly applying
unitary operations from a predetermined set {UAi }i, and
sends back the qubit to Bob through the quantum back-
ward channel (QBC). Instead, in CM, she measures the
received qubit in a given basis, by choosing randomly
among the possible preparation bases used by Bob, to
get information about the prepared state. It is important
to note that the QFC and the QBC are the same phys-
ical channel and the distinction is used to facilitate the
description of the eavesdropping attacks.
3. Bob measures the qubit in the i-th preparation basis to
decode the information.
4. After all the qubits have been transmitted and measured,
a leftover part of the protocol is carried out through-
out a classical channel. Alice publicly reveals which
qubits were used for CM and which ones for EM. In the
case of CM Alice and Bob compare the prepared states
and the measurement outcomes, whenever Alice’s mea-
surements had been performed properly in the prepara-
tion basis. This procedure allows them to establish the
forward noise Q f , defined as the probability that such
states don’t match up. On the other hand, a fraction of
the systems used for EM is randomly chosen to deter-
mine the probability that encoded and decoded symbols
be different, Q, the overall noise. The remaining sym-
bols are not disclosed and constitute what is known as
the “raw key”.
5. Classical post-processing: Alice and Bob interchange
additional classical information in order to obtain iden-
tical and completely secret bit strings starting from their
raw keys. To this aim two sub-protocols are required.
The first is called “error correction” [31] and it is used
to amend the errors associated to the overall noise Q.
In this way, the encoded and decoded keys become per-
fectly correlated, i.e., Alice’s and Bob’s bits are iden-
tical. In the following sub-protocol information po-
tentially leaked during the quantum transmission is re-
moved from the key, which is known as “privacy ampli-
fication” [32]. Here we will consider the usual approach
for the classical post-processing, where the involved
sub-protocols are implemented with one-way classical
communication (see, e.g., [33] for a different approach).
Figure 1. (Color online) Schematic illustration of the quantum part
of the general TWQKD protocol, with Alice at the left side, Bob at
the right side and a eventual eavesdropper (Eve) at the center (the
classical communication channel is omitted). The states {|ψi〉}i and
the unitary operations {UAi }i are chosen probabilistically by Bob and
Alice, respectively. Bob performs the decoding measuring the qubit
in the preparation basis and for CM Alice measures the received qubit
in any of the possible preparation bases (randomly chosen). Alice
also chose randomly between EM and CM with probabilities pe and
pc, respectively. See the general protocol description in the main text
for more details.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR A SIMPLE TWQKD
PROTOCOL
A. General eavesdropper attack and security proof
Let us consider a generic TWQKD protocol where Alice
uses the encoding operations set {IA, σAz } (the bits “0” and “1”
are encoded with the application of the unitary operation IA
and σAz , respectively) and Bob’s preparation is such that Eve
observes the state IA/2 in the QFC. In what follows we will
denote operators acting on the encoded qubit Hilbert space
with the superscript A. Other details, such as the preparation
bases used by Bob, are irrelevant by now. For keys of infinite
size, the secret fraction, r, is given by [34, 35]
r = I(A : B) − IE = 1 − h(Q) − IE , (1)
where I(A : B) is the mutual information between Alice’s and
Bob’s data, which measures the correlation of the encoded
and decoded keys. If Alice sends one bit, i.e., she uses IA
and σAz with equal probability, I(A : B) = 1 − h(Q), being
h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) the binary entropy and
Q the probability of miss-matching between the encoded and
decoded bit. Here, we assume (as usual) that the quantum
channel is a depolarizing channel [36] and hence Q does not
depend on the specific states carrying the information. More-
over, IE represents the maximum information that the eaves-
dropper (Eve) can obtain using her best strategy (the expres-
sion for IE will be presented latter).
We consider the case of collective attacks and classical
post-processing implemented with “direct reconciliation”, im-
plying that IE corresponds to Eve’s knowledge about the en-
coded key [2]. Accordingly, the most general attack that Eve
can perform in the QFC consists of a joint interaction between
the sent qubit and some auxiliar ancilla. Without loss of gen-
erality, this interaction may be represented as
U |i〉kˆ |〉 = |0〉kˆ | kˆi0〉 + |1〉kˆ | kˆi1〉; i = 0, 1. (2)
3whereU is a unitary operation acting on the joint Hilbert space
of the ancilla and the qubit, and |〉 is the ancilla state before
the attack. The set {|i〉kˆ}i=0,1 contains the eigenstates of the
Pauli operator kˆ.~σ, which corresponds to the kˆ direction in the
Bloch sphere. Unitarity is guaranteed whenever the ancilla
states {| kˆi j〉}0≤i, j≤1 fulfil the conditions:
〈 kˆi0| kˆi0〉 + 〈 kˆi1| kˆi1〉 = 1, 〈 kˆ00| kˆ10〉 + 〈 kˆ01| kˆ11〉 = 0. (3)
After the forward attack, Eve resends the qubit to Alice
and stores her ancilla until the qubit is sent back through the
QBC. In this way, the joint encoded states that she can ac-
cess in the QBC are ρAE|0 = U(IA/2 ⊗ |〉〈|)U† and ρAE|1 =
σAz U(I
A/2⊗|〉〈|)U†σAz , with ρAE|0 (ρAE|1) being the state con-
ditioned to the Alice’s encoded bit “0” (“1”). Following the
definition of collective attack, Eve can extract the encoded in-
formation by performing coherent measurements on any num-
ber of qubits and ancillae that she considers convenient. To
this aim, it is assumed that she has an unlimited resource of
quantum memory at her disposition [37]. Accordingly, the
expression for Eve’s information is given by [35]:
IE = max{U}
χ
= max
{U}
{
S
(
ρAE|0 + ρAE|1
2
)
− 1
2
[S (ρAE|0) + S (ρAE|1)]
}
,
(4)
where S (ρ) = Tr ρ log2 ρ is the von Neumann entropy and
χ is the Holevo quantity [38] for the alphabet encoded into
{ρAE|i}i=0,1. The maximization is taken over all possible Eve’s
unitaries.
Since the conditional density operator ρAE|i only differ
of IA/2 ⊗ |〉〈| by unitary transformations, we can write
S (ρAE|i) = S (IA/2 ⊗ |〉〈|) = 1. Hence,
IE = max{U}
[
S (ρAE) − 1
]
, (5)
with ρAE = 12 (ρ
AE|0 + ρAE|1).
To compute Eve’s information, in Eq. (5), we need first to
obtain the eigenvalues of the Alice-Eve joint state ρAE . We
will perform this task employing the Gram matrix represen-
tation [30]. For a mixed state (written as a mixture of non-
orthogonal pure states) ρ =
∑
i pi|ϕi〉〈ϕi|, ∑i pi = 1, the ele-
ments of the Gram matrix, G, are defined as
Gi j ≡ √pip j〈ϕi|ϕ j〉. (6)
We take advantage of the fact that the eigenvalues of G and ρ
are the same (including their multiplicities) [30], and that ρAE
is by construction a mixture of pure states. In the Appendix
A we write explicitly this matrix, which is of dimension 4 ×
4, and compute its exact eigenvalues. Note that the a priori
Hilbert space for the joint state ρAE is of dimension 8, given
that 4 ancilla states are required to fully describe the Eve’s
forward attack, cf. Eq. (2). This entails a clear advantage of
using the Gram matrix over the standard method (in which
ρAE is written in some orthonormal basis), i.e.: first, finding
a suitable orthonormal basis is not obvious; and second, even
if that were the case, computing the eigenvalues of a 8 × 8
matrix is a considerably more difficult task than doing it for
4 × 4 matrix.
From Eq. (2), we deduce that the perturbation that Eve’s
unitary, U, causes on the qubit state |0〉kˆ (|1〉kˆ) is given
by 〈 kˆ01| kˆ01〉 (〈 kˆ10| kˆ10〉). Considering the generic form of a
TWQKD protocol (described in Section II and Fig. 1) the
set of Bob’s prepared states {|ψi〉}i can be written as {|ψi〉}i =
{|0〉kˆ, |1〉kˆ}kˆ∈{kˆ}, where {kˆ} is the set of Bloch sphere directions
used in the Bob’s preparation. The fact that Eve has access
to the state IA/2 in the forward channel means that Bob pre-
pared |0〉kˆ and |1〉kˆ with the same probability, regardless of the
preparation basis direction choice, kˆ. As aforementioned, we
are assuming that the qubits are sent through a depolarizing
channel and consequently
〈 kˆ01| kˆ01〉 = 〈 kˆ10| kˆ10〉 = Q f , (7)
for any choice kˆ ∈ {kˆ}. Here Q f is the natural noise of the
forward channel, which is simply the probability that Alice
receives |0〉kˆ (|1〉kˆ) if Bob prepared |1〉kˆ (|0〉kˆ). In this way,
Eq. (7) tells us that, in order to pass unnoticed, Eve is re-
stricted to interactions whose perturbation equals Q f for all
the transmitted states. Considering this constraint, we obtain
in Appendix A the following expressions for the eigenvalues
of ρAE :
λ± =
1
4
[
1 ±
√
(1 − 2〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉)2 + 4|〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉|2
]
=
1
4
[
1 ±
√
(1 − 2Q f )2 + 4|〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉|2
]
, (8)
each one with multiplicity 2. Equation (5) is then translated
into IE = max{U}
S (ρAE)− 1 = max
|〈 zˆ00 | zˆ10〉|
S (ρAE)− 1, for fixed Q f . A
simple argument (see Appendix A) leads to conclude that the
von Neumann entropy,
S (ρAE) = −2[λ+log2(λ+) + λ−log2(λ−)],
takes its maximum when |〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉| = 0. Thereby,
max
|〈 zˆ00 | zˆ10〉|
S (ρAE) = 1 + h(Q f ) and
IE = h(〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉) = h(Q f ). (9)
In this case, Eq. (9) allows to determine Eve’s information
in terms of the noise introduced along the zˆ direction, 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉.
This implies that Bob must prepare eigenstates of σAz and Al-
ice must measure such an observable in CM. This kind of pro-
tocol is clearly non-deterministic since the encoding opera-
tions, {IA, σAz }, have no effect on the states {|0〉zˆ, |1〉zˆ}. In the
next subsection we will see that, regardless of the number of
preparation bases used, Eve’s information can not be less than
the given by Eq. (9).
4B. Generalization of the security proof to an arbitrary number
of preparation directions
Here we show that, if the previous protocol is implemented
in a depolarizing channel, no preparation strategy can reduce
IE below the value corresponding to Eq. (9). To this aim we
present an explicit eavesdropping attack that simulates a depo-
larizing channel with noise Q f and provides Eve h(Q f ) bits of
information. Besides the condition le f t〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉 = 〈 zˆ10| zˆ10〉 =
Q f , this attack satisfies the following equations:
〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉 = 〈 zˆ01| zˆ11〉 = 0, (10)
〈 zˆ00| zˆ01〉 = 〈 zˆ10| zˆ11〉 = 0, (11)
〈 zˆ01| zˆ10〉 = 0, 〈 zˆ00| zˆ11〉 = 1 − 2Q f . (12)
A general qubit pure state may be written as |Ω〉 =
sen
(
θ
2
)
|0〉zˆ + eiφcos
(
θ
2
)
|1〉zˆ, where θ and φ are the azimuthal
and polar angles in the Bloch sphere, respectively. The effect
of the forward attack is then
U |Ω〉|〉 = |Ω〉|(Ω)〉 + |Ω⊥〉|(Ω⊥)〉,
where |Ω⊥〉 = cos
(
θ
2
)
|0〉zˆ − eiφsen
(
θ
2
)
|1〉zˆ is the state or-
thogonal to |Ω〉 and {|(Ω)〉, |(Ω⊥)〉} are ancilla states asso-
ciated to the Eve’s attack. The disturbance generated on |Ω〉
is 〈(Ω⊥)|(Ω⊥)〉 = 1 − 〈(Ω)|(Ω)〉, cf. Eq. (3). Taking
into account Eqs. (10)-(12), we show in the Appendix B that
〈(Ω⊥)|(Ω⊥)〉 = Q f .
Thus, we have proved that the attack described by
Eqs. (10)-(12) fully simulates a depolarizing channel with
characteristic noise Q f . On the other hand, Eq. (10) implies
that IE = h(〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉) = h(Q f ). Although this result could
suggest that it is sufficient for Bob to prepare only eigenstates
of σAz , indeed at least one additional basis must be incorpo-
rated into the preparation. As already mentioned, this is nec-
essary because the encoding operations {IA, σAz } do not affect
these prepared states (the eigenstates of σAz ). Furthermore,
the transmission of non-orthogonal states is the key ingredient
to guarantee the protection of the information. Accordingly,
the simplest protocol whose security is established by Eq. (9)
could be one where the encoding is performed with the set
{IA, σAz } and Bob prepares the states {|0〉kˆ, |1〉kˆ}kˆ∈{xˆ,zˆ}. The re-
sults obtained in this section will be employed to prove the
security of the LM05’ protocol in what follows.
IV. SECURITY PROOF FOR THE LM05’ PROTOCOL
The LM05’ protocol corresponds specifically to version 2
of the “Qubit LM05 protocol, implemented with reverse rec-
onciliation”, proposed in Ref. [19]. In this scheme the en-
coding operations are {IA, σAz , σAx , σAy } and Bob’s preparation
is carried out with the states {|0〉kˆ, |1〉kˆ}kˆ∈{xˆ,zˆ}. Moreover, Bob
measures the received state in the preparation basis, interpret-
ing an unchanged state as the bit “0” and one flipped as the
bit “1”. This implies that the protocol is deterministic, since
he can always perfectly distinguish the encoded bit with his
measurements. On the other hand, the operations {σAz , σAx }
can cause a bit flip or act similarly as the identity, depend-
ing on the preparation basis, kˆ ∈ {xˆ, zˆ}. Therefore, at the end
of the quantum transmission Bob must reveal the preparation
bases in order to Alice can infer all the encoded bits. It is
the disclosing of such information what the authors term “re-
verse reconciliation” in [19]. Here we will consider that Bob’s
choices and the corresponding to Alice in each mode of the
protocol (EM and CM) are performed with equal probability.
In CM she measures randomly the observables σAx and σ
A
z to
determine the forward noise.
According to the the description of LM05’, there is not a
unique Holevo quantity to be maximized for obtaining Eve’s
information (Eq. (4)). Instead of that, the states from which
Eve can extract the encoding depend on the associated prepa-
ration direction. Suppose for instance that the Bob’s cho-
sen preparation direction was zˆ. Then, ρAE|0z = 14 [U(I
A ⊗
|〉〈|)U† + σAz U(IA ⊗ |〉〈|)U†σAz ] and ρAE|1z = 14 [σAxU(IA ⊗
|〉〈|)U†σAx +σAyU(IA⊗|〉〈|)U†σAy ], given that the operations
sub-set {σAx , σAy } produce a bit flip while the sub-set {IA, σAz }
leave the state unchanged. In this case the state ρAE turns out
to be
ρAE =
1
8
UIA ⊗ |〉〈|U† + ∑
w=x,y,z
σAwUI
A ⊗ |〉〈|U†σAw

(13)
and the corresponding Holevo quantity,
χz = S (ρAE) − S (ρAE|0z ). (14)
Equation (14) follows from the fact that ρAE|1z = σAxρ
AE|0
z σ
A
x =
σAy ρ
AE|0
z σ
A
y and the von Neumann entropy is invariant under
unitary transformations [36]. The same kind of reasoning
leads to the Holevo quantity corresponding to the Bob’s prepa-
ration in the xˆ direction:
χx = S (ρAE) − S (ρAE|0x ), (15)
where ρAE|0x = 14 [U(I
A ⊗ |〉〈|)U† +σAxU(IA ⊗ |〉〈|)U†σAx ]. In
this way, Eve’s information is given by
IE = max{U}
1
2
(χz + χx) ≤ 12
(
max
{U}
χz + max{U}
χx
)
, (16)
where the factor 1/2 stems from the fact that Bob uses each
preparation basis with equal probability. The upper bound is
due to the general relation max[ f (x) + g(x)] ≤ max f (x) +
maxg(x), for f and g arbitrary functions.
The optimization problem involved in Eq. (16) could, in
principle, be a considerable task. This is so basically due
to the fact that the Holevo quantities are subtractions of two
terms, each one depending on the general unitary U employed
in the eavesdropping attack. Moreover, the Gram matrix as-
sociated to ρAE would be of dimension 8 × 8, which prevents
a possible analytical advantage associated to the use of such
a representation. To circumvent this hindrance, we introduce
5a slight modification to the protocol, thereby reducing its se-
curity proof to that of the protocol considered in the previous
section. Such a modification consists in additional classical
information that Alice publicly reveals at the end of the quan-
tum transmission, such as follows:
• If the preparation direction was xˆ and Alice used IA or
σAz , she announces thatσ
A
x andσ
A
y were discarded. Sim-
ilarly, if Alice used σAx or σ
A
y , she announces that I
A and
σAz were discarded.
• If the preparation direction was zˆ and Alice used IA or
σAx , she announces thatσ
A
y andσ
A
z were discarded. Sim-
ilarly, if Alice used σAy or σ
A
z , she announces that I
A and
σAx were discarded.
Notice that in this scenario Eve is unable to obtain directly
any information about the encoded bit. However, the encoded
states that she can access in the QBC take a simpler form now.
Consider the case when Bob’s preparation was along the xˆ
direction and Alice used IA. Thus, we have
%AE|0x = U(I
A/2 ⊗ |〉〈|)U†,
%AE|1x = σ
A
z U(I
A/2 ⊗ |〉〈|)U†σAz , (17)
where we have designed the density operator by % instead of
ρ to emphasize that these states correspond to the modified
protocol.
The corresponding Holevo quantity, χ′x = S (
1
2 (%
AE|0
x +
%AE|1x )) − S (%AE|0x ), takes exactly the same form when Alice
performed σAx or σ
A
y , due to the invariance of the von Neu-
mann entropy under unitary transformations. Using the same
reasoning, it is easy to obtain the Holevo quantity correspond-
ing to the case when the preparation direction is zˆ, whose the
general expression is given by
χ′w = S (%
AE
w ) − S (%AE|0); w = z, x, (18)
with %AE|0 = %AE|0x and %AEw =
1
4 [U(I
A ⊗ |〉〈|)U† + σAw′U(IA ⊗
|〉〈 |)U†σAw′ ]; w′ being the complementary direction of w, i.e.,
w′ = x if w = z and vice-versa. The associated expression for
Eve’s information, IE , is the same of Eq. (16) with the modi-
fied Holevo quantities. The bound appearing in that equation
can be written as
IE ≤ 12(I
z
E + IxE),
where IwE = max{U} χ
′
w. It is worthwhile to note that IxE corre-
sponds exactly to IE in Eq. (9) and hence IxE = h(〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉).
To find the expression for IzE , we can proceed in a way com-
pletely analogous to the one leading to Eq. (9), writing the
Gram matrix with the states {| xˆi j〉} instead of {| zˆi j〉} (see Eq. (2)
and Appendix A). It is thus not difficult to grasp that the re-
sult is IzE = h(〈 xˆ01| xˆ01〉). In this way, the estimation of the
noise 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉 (〈 xˆ01| xˆ01〉) allows to determine Eve’s informa-
tion when the encoded states were prepared along the xˆ (zˆ)
direction. Assuming a depolarizing channel we get
IE ≤ 12[h(〈
xˆ
01| xˆ01〉) + h(〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉)] = h(Q f ). (19)
Figure 2. (Color online) Schematic illustration of the quantum part of
the TWQKD six-state protocol (the classical communication channel
is omitted). Alice (on the left side) and Bob (on the right side) per-
form each of their possible choices with equal probability, i.e., basis
direction kˆ for the state preparation, (in EM) Alice’s encoding oper-
ation, and (in CM) Alice’s measurement basis.
At this point, we remark that the objective of the introduced
modification is to simplify the security proof and by no means
is necessary in practice. Actually, it potentially reduces Eve’s
uncertainty about the encoding and therefore IE (Eq. (19)) is
an upper bound to the Eve’s information, IE , for the LM05’
protocol. Furthermore, such a bound coincides with the one
calculated in [19] employing other methods. On the other
hand, we show in Appendix C that the attack represented by
Eqs. (10)-(12) makes such bound in Eq. (19) tight, which im-
plies that for the modified version Eve can in fact get h(Q f )
bits of information.
V. OTHER DETERMINISTIC TWQKD PROTOCOLS
A. The TWQKD six-state protocol
Considering the LM05’ protocol, we note that if besides zˆ
and xˆ one includes the preparation direction yˆ and Bob always
measures in the preparation basis, the resulting scheme is still
deterministic. The reason is that, as in the case of LM05’,
the encoding operations {IA, σAz , σAx , σAy } always flip or leave
unchanged the prepared state depending on the preparation
basis. Now let us suppose that Alice and Bob perform their
choices according to a uniform probability distribution. The
resulting scheme, which we term “TWQKD six-state” (given
the use of the same preparation strategy of the six-state pro-
tocol [10]), had not been proposed to date, to the best of our
knowledge. We leave the remaining details of the protocol
identical to those of LM05’. Regarding the decoding, for ex-
ample, Alice and Bob agree that a unchanged (flipped) state
corresponds to the bit “0” (“1”). To that aim Bob must pub-
licly disclose his basis preparation choices after the quantum
transmission, so that Alice can know the effect of her opera-
tions in each case. Furthermore, in CM Alice should measure
any of the observables {σAx , σAy , σAz } with equal probability, in
order to determine the noise introduced along each direction.
Figure 2 illustrates the quantum part of this protocol.
Similar to the LM05’ protocol case, for the TWQKD six-
state protocol there is a Holevo quantity associated to each
6possible direction chosen by Bob:
χw = S (ρAE) − S (ρAE|0w ); w = x, y, z, (20)
where the Alice-Eve joint state ρAE is given by Eq. (13)
with the conditional joint state ρAE|0w = 14 [U(I
A ⊗ |〉〈|)U† +
σAwU(I
A⊗|〉〈|)U†σAw], w = x, y, z. Likewise, the optimization
to obtain Eve’s information, IE = max{U}
1
3
∑
w=x,y,z χw, is at least
as difficult as doing it for LM05’ (Eq. (16)). Nevertheless, the
security of the TWQKD six-state scheme immediately follows
from that of LM05’, since the only difference is the usage of
the additional preparation direction yˆ and it constrains more
Eve’s strategies (she must now cause the same perturbation
not only along xˆ and zˆ but also along yˆ). This implies that
Eve’s information is also upper bounded by h(Q f ), according
to Eq. (19).
In Appendix C we compute the von Neumann entropies,
S (ρAE) and S (ρAE|0w ), for the unitary transformation described
by Eqs. (10)-(12). The corresponding eavesdropping infor-
mation is given by
1
3
∑
w=x,y,z
χw = Q f + (1 − Q f )h
(
2 − 3Q f
2(1 − Q f )
)
. (21)
The right hand side of Eq. (21) is identical to the expression
for Eve’s information corresponding to the six-state protocol
[2, 28, 29]. This is remarkable if one considers that the same
kind of states are prepared in both the six-state scheme and
its TWQKD version. Moreover, the analysed attack is in fact
one of the most powerful since it makes tight the bound in
Eq. (19), as we also prove in Appendix C. Based on these
facts, we conjecture that Eq. (21) actually corresponds to IE
for the TWQKD six-state protocol. We can summarize the
results concerning the LM05’ and TWQKD six-state schemes
with the following inequallity:
Q f + (1 − Q f )h
(
2 − 3Q f
2(1 − Q f )
)
≤ ITWQKD six-stateE
≤ ILM05’E ≤ h(Q f ). (22)
These bounds are plotted in Fig. 3, as well as the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob (I(A : B)), and the eaves-
dropping information (IE) for the LM05 protocol.
B. Generalized version of the LM05 protocol
Now let us consider a TWQKD protocol in which Bob pre-
pares states from the set {|ψi〉}i =
{
1√
2
(
|0〉 + eiφ|1〉
)}
0≤φ≤2pi
,
i.e., any state on the perpendicular plane to the z direction
of the Bloch sphere, and Alice performs the encoding with
{UAi }i = {IA, σAz }. Such a protocol is clearly deterministic and
can be considered as a generalization of the LM05 protocol
[16], which only uses two bases for the preparation, e.g. σx
and σy. We will show that this generalized protocol does not
have any advantage over the standard LM05, within the as-
sumption that the channel used to transmit the states is depo-
larizing. We start computing the eavesdropping information
Figure 3. (Color online) Comparison of the Alice-Bob Mutual Infor-
mation I(A : B) (blue solid line) and Eve’s Information (IE) for dif-
ferent protocols, as function of the forward noise (Q f ). It is assumed
that the overall noise (Q) and the forward noise coincide, which is
the case if the QFC and the QBC are correlated (see, e.g., in Ref.
[19] some comments at this respect).IE for the generalized LM05
protocol is plotted as a (dark-green) dotted line. The upper bound
to IE for LM05’ protocol is represented by a (dark-yellow) dashed
line. The lower bound to IE for the TWQKD six-state is drawn as the
(dark-red) dash-dotted line.
for the attack described by the following conditions:
〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉 = 〈 zˆ01| zˆ11〉 = 0, (23)
〈 zˆ00| zˆ01〉 = 〈 zˆ10| zˆ11〉 = 0, (24)
〈 zˆ01| zˆ10〉 = 0, 〈 zˆ00| zˆ11〉 = 1 − 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉. (25)
This attack only differs from the one represented by Eqs. (10)-
(12) concerning the value of the element 〈 zˆ00| zˆ11〉. In addition,
we write 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉 instead of Q f because 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉 is not the
disturbance measured in this protocol.
Considering that the state |φ〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉 + eiφ|1〉
)
is equal
to |Ω〉 (defined in Section III B) for θ = pi/2, we can use
Eq. (B3) from Appendix B to compute the perturbation that
the attack defined by Eqs. (23)-(25) introduces on such a
state. Expressing the attack unitary operation as U |φ〉|〉 =
|φ〉|(φ)〉+ |φ⊥〉|(φ⊥)〉, with |φ⊥〉 being the state perpendicular
to |φ〉, we have
〈(φ)|(φ)〉 = sen4
(
pi
4
)
(1 − 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉)
+ sen2
(
pi
4
)
cos2
(
pi
4
)
〈 zˆ00| zˆ11〉
+ 2sen2
(
pi
4
)
cos2
(
pi
4
)
〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉
+ cos2
(
pi
4
)
sen2
(
pi
4
)
〈 zˆ11| zˆ00〉
+ cos4
(
pi
4
)
(1 − 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉) = 1 −
〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉
2
,
7where Eqs. (23)-(25) have been employed. Thus, using the
unitarity condition, we have 〈(φ⊥)|(φ⊥)〉 = 〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉/2.
Using this result and the fact that, from Eq. (23), this at-
tack provides Eve h(〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉) bits of information (it fulfills
the condition to get Eq. (9)), we get
IE = h (2〈(φ⊥)|(φ⊥)〉) = h(2Q f ). (26)
We have taken into account that 〈(φ⊥)|(φ⊥)〉 must coincide
with the forward noise. The expression in Eq. (26) is exactly
the found for the LM05 protocol in [26] and therefore we have
proved that it is not possible to improve the protocol security
with this extended version on the number of preparation basis.
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the performance of TWQKD protocols
that distribute a secret key by means of non-orthogonal qubit
states. For the security analysis we have used techniques
whose application is new in the context of secure communi-
cations, to the best of our knowledge. Specifically, we em-
ployed a matrix representation [30] that allows to easily com-
pute the eigenvalues of certain density operators, involved in
the determination of the amount of the eavesdropping infor-
mation. In this way, a simple calculation leads to Eq. (9),
which is the more important expression for the posterior anal-
ysis. With this equation we provided a new (alternative) se-
curity proof for a protocol proposed in Ref. [19] (that we
have named LM05’), obtaining an upper bound to the eaves-
dropping information that coincides with the previous result
in [19]. Moreover, we proposed a novel protocol (TWQKD
six-state) that is at least as secure as LM05’ and computed
an analytical lower bound to the eavesdropping information.
Such a bound equals the maximum eavesdropping informa-
tion corresponding to the six-state scheme [2, 28, 29]. We
remark that the security of the TWQKD six-state protocol is
possibly better than that of the LM05’ protocol, since an ad-
ditional preparation basis is used by Bob, and therefore our
lower bound could be tight. Finally, we showed that the in-
clusion of more than two preparation bases does not improve
the security of the LM05 protocol [26]. The construction of
a full security proof for the new TWQKD six-state protocol
proposed here as well as its experimental analysis and tests
are interesting directions for a future research.
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Appendix A: von Neumann entropy of the state ρAE (Eq. (5))
In this appendix we maximize the von Neu-
mann entropy for the Alice-Eve joint state ρAE =
1
4
[
U(I ⊗ |〉〈|)U† + σAz U(I ⊗ |〉〈|)U†σAz
]
, assuming that
〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉 = 〈 zˆ10| zˆ10〉 = Q f is fixed. Using Eq. (2), with kˆ = zˆ,
and Eq. (6), the corresponding Gram matrix is explicitly
written as
G =
1
4

1 0 1 − 2Q f 2〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉
0 1 2〈 zˆ10| zˆ00〉 2Q f − 1
1 − 2Q f 2〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉 1 0
2〈 zˆ10| zˆ00〉 2Q f − 1 0 1
 .
The eigenvalues of G are given by
λ± =
1
4
[1 ±
√
(1 − 2Q f )2 + 4|〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉|2],
which implies that the von Neumann entropy S [ρAE] will be a
function of Q f and |〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉|. For a fixed Q f we obtain
S (ρAE) = −2[λ+(x)log2(λ+(x)) + λ−(x)log2(λ−(x))],
with x ≡ |〈 zˆ00| zˆ10〉|. Taking the derivative with respect x, it
is easy to see that S (ρAE) is monotonically decreasing in the
interval (0, 1) and therefore S (ρAE) takes its maximum at x =
0.
Appendix B: Disturbance on any qubit pure state caused by the
attack described by Eqs. (10)-(12)
Using the expression for a general qubit pure state, |Ω〉 =
sen
(
θ
2
)
|0〉zˆ + eiφcos
(
θ
2
)
|1〉zˆ, given in Section III B, we can
write the action of an eavesdropping interaction U as
U(|Ω〉|〉) = sen
(
θ
2
)
U |0〉zˆ|〉 + eiφcos
(
θ
2
)
U |1〉zˆ|〉
= sen
(
θ
2
) {
|0〉zˆ| zˆ00〉 + |1〉zˆ| zˆ01〉
}
+ eiφcos
(
θ
2
) {
|0〉zˆ| zˆ10〉 + |1〉zˆ| zˆ11〉
}
, (B1)
were we have considered the linearity of U and Eq. (2) has
been used, with kˆ = zˆ.
Taking into account that |Ω〉 and its orthonormal state,
|Ω⊥〉 = cos
(
θ
2
)
|0〉zˆ − eiφsen
(
θ
2
)
|1〉zˆ, are defined in terms of
the states {|0〉zˆ, |1〉zˆ}, we have
|0〉zˆ = sen
(
θ
2
)
|Ω〉 + cos
(
θ
2
)
|Ω⊥〉,
|1〉zˆ = e−iφ
(
cos
(
θ
2
)
|Ω〉 − sen
(
θ
2
)
|Ω⊥〉
)
. (B2)
Therefore, using Eq. (B2), we can rewrite Eq. (B1) as
U |Ω〉|〉 = |Ω〉|(Ω)〉 + |Ω⊥〉|(Ω⊥)〉,
with
|(Ω)〉 = sen2
(
θ
2
)
| zˆ00〉 + sen
(
θ
2
)
cos
(
θ
2
)
e−iφ| zˆ01〉
+ eiφcos
(
θ
2
)
sen
(
θ
2
)
| zˆ10〉 + cos2
(
θ
2
)
| zˆ11〉, (B3)
8and a similar expression holds for |(Ω⊥)〉.
If the states {| zˆi j〉} satisfy Eqs. (10)-(12), then
〈(Ω)|(Ω)〉 = sen4
(
θ
2
)
(1 − Q f ) + sen2
(
θ
2
)
cos2
(
θ
2
)
〈 zˆ00| zˆ11〉
+ 2sen2
(
θ
2
)
cos2
(
θ
2
)
Q f
+ cos2
(
θ
2
)
sen2
(
θ
2
)
〈 zˆ11| zˆ00〉
+ cos4
(
θ
2
)
(1 − Q f ) = 1 − Q f .
Hence, by the unitarity of U, 〈(Ω⊥)|(Ω⊥)〉 = 1 −
〈(Ω)|(Ω)〉 = Q f .
Appendix C: Probable expression for Eve’s information in the
TWQKD six-state protocol
Here we compute the eavesdropping information for the
TWQKD six-state protocol, when the attack is given by
Eqs. (10)-(12). The average over the associated Holevo quan-
tities, Eq. (20), is:
1
3
∑
w=x,y,z
χw =
1
3
∑
w=x,y,z
{
S
[
ρAE
]
− S
[
ρAE|0w
]}
.
The elements of the Gram Matrix correspond-
ing to ρAE result from the scalar products between
the states {U |i〉zˆ|〉, σAwU |i〉zˆ|〉}i,w, being U the at-
tack described by Eqs. (10)-(12). For this at-
tack it turns out that the sets {|ϕ(1)1 〉, ..., |ϕ(1)4 〉} ≡
{U |0〉zˆ|〉, σAxU |1〉zˆ|〉, σAyU |1〉zˆ|〉, σAz U |0〉zˆ|〉} and
{|ϕ(2)1 〉, ..., |ϕ(2)4 〉} ≡ {U |1〉zˆ|〉, σAxU |0〉zˆ|〉, σAyU |0〉zˆ|〉, σAz U |1〉zˆ|〉}
are orthogonal. We denote the Gram Matrices associated to
the first and second sets as G(1)and G(2), respectively, and
their elements are (see Eq. (6)) G(k)i j =
1
4 〈ϕ(k)i |ϕ(k)j 〉, k = 1, 2.
The orthogonality property implies that the eigenvalues of ρAE
are derived from the corresponding to G(1)and G(2). Using
Eqs. (10)-(12) and the usual assumption of the depolarizing
channel, we get
G(1) =
1
4

1 1 − 2Q f −i(1 − 2Q f ) 1 − 2Q f
1 − 2Q f 1 −i(1 − 2Q f ) 1 − 2Q f
i(1 − 2Q f ) i(1 − 2Q f ) 1 i(1 − 2Q f )
1 − 2Q f 1 − 2Q f −i(1 − 2Q f ) 1
 ,
G(2) =
1
4

1 1 − 2Q f i(1 − 2Q f ) −(1 − 2Q f )
1 − 2Q f 1 i(1 − 2Q f ) −(1 − 2Q f )
−i(1 − 2Q f ) −i(1 − 2Q f ) 1 i(1 − 2Q f )
−(1 − 2Q f ) −(1 − 2Q f ) −i(1 − 2Q f ) 1
 .
One finds that the eigenvalues of G(1) and G(2) are {1 −
1.5Q f , 0.5Q f }, the first one having multiplicity 3. Therefore,
S (ρAE) = 2 − 3
2
Q f log2Q f −
2 − 3Q f
2
log2(2 − 3Q f ). (C1)
For the analysed attack we already know that S
(
ρAE|0z
)
=
1+h(〈 zˆ01| zˆ01〉) = 1+h(Q f ), according to Eq. (10). On the other
hand, the sets {U |i〉zˆ|〉, σAxU |i〉zˆ|〉}i and {U |i〉zˆ|〉, σAyU |i〉zˆ|〉}i
determine the Gram matrices needed to compute S
[
ρAE|0x
]
and
S
[
ρAE|0y
]
. The obtained expressions are
Gx =
1
4

1 0 0 1 − 2Q f
0 1 1 − 2Q f 0
0 1 − 2Q f 1 0
1 − 2Q f 0 0 1
 ,
corresponding to ρAE|0x , and
Gy =
i
4

−i 0 0 −(1 − 2Q f )
0 −i (1 − 2Q f ) 0
0 −(1 − 2Q f ) −i 0
(1 − 2Q f ) 0 0 −i
 ,
for ρAE|0y . The eigenvalues of Gx and Gy are {0.5Q f , 0.5(1 −
Q f )}, each one with multiplicity 2. Therefore,
S
(
ρAE|0w
)
= 1 + h(Q f ); w = x, y, z. (C2)
From Eqs. (C1) and (C2), the information that Eve gets us-
ing this attack is thus
1
3
∑
w=x,y,z
χw = Q f + (1 − Q f )h
(
2 − 3Q f
2(1 − Q f )
)
.
Notice in particular that Eq. (C2) entails that the bound
Eq. (19) is tight.
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